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SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT, PART V
―BEIJING CONSENSUS‖ ANYONE?
John Ohnesorge*
There are enough questions on the table to get us going, so I’ll focus on
responding to some of them. First, to an issue raised by Salil Mehra1 and
Tom Ginsburg,2 I generally follow the approach taken by Trubek and Santos in The New Law and Economic Development.3 Their approach defines
the field (―doctrine‖) of Law and Development to encompass the activities
of legal assistance providers,4 as well as the ideas about law, and about development economics, that animate their work. There are different strategies for studying the providers’ activities, and Terence Halliday and Bruce
Carruthers’s research for their book, Bankrupt,5 provides an outstanding example of the detailed sociological work some Law and Development scholars undertake. But the academic enterprise doesn’t really seem separable
from the activities of the providers. We could discuss the pros and cons of
that dependence, but I do not think we can avoid it. The institutional players in the field rise and fall in importance over time, the ideologies concerning law and economics that animate their work change over time, the
external environment affecting the institutions changes over time, and this
complex, dynamic stew provides the academic core of Law and Development. The academic field is not merely the sum of the projects, as Tamanaha appears set to argue, but is instead the study of those projects in their
political, historical, and ideological contexts. The problem this background
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poses for the scholar is that he or she must first figure out a level of engagement with the institutional players that will allow the scholar to understand what is actually going on inside them, and in their relations with
national governments, while leaving the scholar free to provide serious academic analysis and critique. I sometimes joke that Law and Development is
a field where those who know don’t talk, and those who talk don’t know,
but it is actually a serious problem for a scholarly field.
A second response I have to Salil’s post is that LLSV6 and the International Competition Network (ICN)7 provide two great examples of why
claims about law and economic development put forth by academics or
provider organizations ought to be evaluated in light of actual episodes of
successful economic development. The episodes I have studied occurred, in
large part, in Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and now China)
during the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s. I think most observers would
agree that corporate law during those episodes did not fare very well by
LLSV criteria, and that competition law, likewise, did not exactly succeed
in enforcing ―competition cultures‖ in those economies.8 Both minority
shareholder protections and competition law have become more important
in Northeast Asia in recent years, but this is coming long after the periods
of rapid economic growth have ended. Rather than searching in a more
context-sensitive way for different tools that might work to invigorate a
competition culture in different national settings, as Fox advocates, I think
the Northeast Asian experience demands that we take the Law and Development inquiry back a level, to ask ourselves what exactly it is we think developing countries need from corporate or competition law. Doing this
forces us to ask whether we are working on goals for them or for us. Are
we interested in minority shareholder rights in South Korea because we actually believe, in the face of Korea’s own experience, that minority shareholder rights are important in a developing economy, or are we just trying
to make the world safe for our institutional investors, to help us diversify
our portfolios? Of course, it is possible that what is good for us is also good
for South Koreans, but we should not simply assume so. Northeast Asia’s
highly successful economic development has been accompanied by a series
6
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of bruising battles with the United States and Europe over the way those
countries implemented trade, investment, intellectual property, and competition policies, which ought to suggest that our prevailing Law and Development common sense may radically overstate the importance of these
areas of law for developing countries.
Turning to Tom’s second question, the fact that so few of us want to
use history to examine critically our assumptions about law’s relationship to
economic development suggests that we have not learned enough about
Law and Development since the advances made in the 1960s. Even today,
many of us still seem, explicitly or implicitly, to believe in the inherent
goodness of law and legal institutions, that law is a seamless web, so that
economic reforms will necessarily spill over into political reforms, and that
our societies have something called the Rule of Law that we could export to
practically any society, given sufficient time and resources. Why do we believe these things? Perhaps a better question is whether it would be possible to engage in the work of Law and Development without believing in at
least a weak version of these oft-criticized propositions.
As to the future, I think that just as the Asian financial crisis of the
1990s worked to delegitimize the idea of an Asian development model,9 the
fact that blame for the global financial crisis is being pinned largely on the
United States will encourage renewed interest in alternative styles of capitalism—and will make it harder to sell legal reform packages that are obviously derived from U.S. models. Whether this reaction will be a good
thing overall will depend upon one’s fundamental political values, because
the oft-criticized political nature of Law and Development projects10 means
that basic political values will also be implicated in any shift away from a
liberal, market-oriented economic governance paradigm. ―Beijing Consensus,‖11 anyone?
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DISPLACING ―DEVELOPMENT‖: THE NEW AGENDA FOR RULE OF LAW
ASSISTANCE
Veronica L. Taylor**
I find Brian Tamanaha’s differentiation of Law and Development and
legal development12 both helpful and persuasive. I wonder, however,
whether we should rigorously rethink offering ―Law and Development‖ as
the defining name for an academic field. The problem of causality and direction in coupling ―law‖ and ―development‖ has been exhaustively debated, so we will leave that to one side. Let me give three suggestions why
new dimensions of rule of law seem to map outside ―Law and Development‖ and displace it as a meaningful field marker.13
The first cleavage between ―law‖ and ―development‖ is in the financial
flows directed at the militarization of rule of law. Colonial powers and
twentieth-century invaders frequently used the military to organize and deliver both military and civilian justice.14 The twenty-first-century version of
this military ―standing-up‖ of legal institutions can be seen in the police
forces, prison systems, prosecution services, and courts in places such as
Iraq, Afghanistan, Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands, and Somalia. More
controversial is the way in which U.S. and allied Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq confer with local leaders and
communities about justice issues or offer resources. On one view, these
short-term military tasks are distinguishable from long-term ―developmental‖ tasks such as clarifying property rights, regulating the finance system,
or educating the next generation of legal professionals. On another view,
however, they create confusion in conflict zones because they seem to duplicate activities that would usually be led by civilian development specialists, while not being coordinated with civilian-law reforms that proceed in
parallel in urban centers.15 As the conflicts continue in Iraq, Afghanistan,
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and Somalia, this short-run militarized rule-of-law programming looks
more and more like a permanent rule-of-law modality.
Second, rule-of-law assistance continues apace for non-development
reasons, reasons that are diplomatic, commercial, cultural, and military.16
The last decade of Asia-focused legal reform projects sponsored by the Japanese government, for example, included assisting Vietnam and Cambodia
with Code-drafting and establishing Japanese law centers at universities in
Vietnam, Cambodia, Uzbekistan, and Mongolia.17 Although these endeavors are worthwhile and also advance Japan’s national profile in these regions, they are only related to ―development‖ (however defined) in a fairly
tenuous way.18
Third, rule-of-law assistance is now completely intertwined with the
projection onto target countries of post-industrial regulatory techniques that
are themselves a technocratic export. Those regulatory exports (for example, South Carolina’s prison system to Afghanistan) frequently have little to
do with the ―development‖ of the target country and quite often take a domestic regulatory failure and spread it further. Because law and regulation
are service sector exports within a global industry, however, I am less sanguine than Tamanaha about what would happen if the distorting effect of
donor funding ceased tomorrow.19 Although the pace of implementation
might be slow, I am not confident that locally responsive, indigenous legal
development would simply rise up to fill the donor-driven rule-of-law vacuum.
If there is an upside to the globalization of rule-of-law assistance, it
may be its visibility, and, thus, its vulnerability to critique. But increasingly, I think, any critique offered must be grounded in more than a demonstration of developmental failure because, whatever the rhetoric, the
implementation design in so many cases of rule-of-law assistance clearly
betrays a military, commercial, or diplomatic agenda that has little to do
with ―Law and Development.‖
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